ABM or ASAT

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17 years

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Do we know what the modifications to the missile were?

The only physical changes to the SM-3 missile that I’m aware of involved the installation of a fair amount of instrumentation, plus telemetry hardware (all provided by the US Missile Defense Agency). The remaining changes were to software in the missile, and probably to the shipboard Aegis system.

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17 years 1 month

Posts: 133

Ohh, lets be honest... there are claims this satellite was 3 tons and the size of a bus and was a huge threat to people on the ground because of the fuel it had on board. Sounds tiny compared to a space shuttle reentering...

That's very true, but if I remember correctly, NASA were planning on landing the Shuttle softly on an airstrip at the Kennedy Space Center instead of shooting it down, as crazy as this sounds now. :rolleyes:

The reality is that this was an NRO satellite and the US didn't want it falling just anywhere where just anyone could pick up the pieces.

Nah, mostly they wanted to test the Aegis system and the SM-3 against a satellite, and were lucky enough to have a valid excuse to do so.

It certainly wouldn't be reduced to powder and there would likely be relatively big chunks hitting the ground but the fuel would be very unlikely to make it to the ground.

The hydrazine tank was the most likely thing to make it to the ground intact, as Mercurius just pointed out. There's no telling whether it would have survived impact, however, as it would very likely have hit the ground much faster than the Shuttle's tanks due to lower drag. There was more than one reason for destroying the satellite, and this was a valid one.

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17 years

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The hydrazine tank was the most likely thing to make it to the ground intact.

The problem with the satellite seems to have been that the solar panels did not deploy. Within a day or so, the limited battery power had run down, leaving the satellite completely inert.

The hydrazine was thought to have frozen, so that tank was expected to land still filled with hydrazine slush that would then evaporate. Since the fuel lines would have been ripped as the satellite disintegrated during re-entry, the tank’s contents would have been able to escape in liquid and/or gaseous form as the slush melted.

Nah, mostly they wanted to test the Aegis system and the SM-3 against a satellite, and were lucky enough to have a valid excuse to do so.

Hahahahaha... yeah, it was the AEGIS system that tracked the satellite around the planet... Wow claims for AEGIS just get better and better don't they... I expect in 5 years they are going to be detecting comets entering the solar system and determining which are on a collision course with Earth... :rolleyes:

Since the fuel lines would have been ripped as the satellite disintegrated during re-entry, the tank’s contents would have been able to escape in liquid and/or gaseous form as the slush melted.

Yeah... the most dangerous WMD since Saddam.

There's no telling whether it would have survived impact, however, as it would very likely have hit the ground much faster than the Shuttle's tanks due to lower drag.

Skylab was much bigger and heavier and also empty... the likelyhood of someone actually being hit by a part of the satellite is very low. It is most likely that it would have landed in water anyway.

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16 years 10 months

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In my view, this interception by the US was an ASAT test in the "true sense" of the term, as there was target detection and tracking, which was not in any pre-determined orbit. The interceptor's launch location and time was also dynamically decided.

I would like to know the tactical or strategic reason if any, for developing 2 different kinds of ABM systems by the US i.e. the Thaad-Patriot system, and the Aegis system.
Other than the fact that the Aegis uses a naval platform, and has a dedicated last-stage separation for calibrated maneuvering toward the target, there appears to be no significant difference between the development of these 2 systems.

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17 years

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I would like to know the tactical or strategic reason if any, for developing 2 different kinds of ABM systems by the US i.e. the Thaad-Patriot system, and the Aegis system.
Other than the fact that the Aegis uses a naval platform, and has a dedicated last-stage separation for calibrated maneuvering toward the target, there appears to be no significant difference between the development of these 2 systems.

It’s been a while since I was last briefed some on some of the programmes you mentioned, SM-3, but I’m sufficiently familiar with all of them to take a stab at answering your question.

There are in fact three programmes – THAAD, Patriot PAC-3, and Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) – that we need to consider. The way that these evolved was partly constrained by the existing hardware that both services already possessed.

Patriot was originally started as the SAM-D programme, and was originally intended to have a tactical ABM capability. But when the US and USSR agreed to limit ABM deployment, SAM-D had to be recast as a pure anti-aircraft system. The result was Patriot.

By the 1980s some degree of ABM capability was needed, and this was achieved by creating the PAC-1 version, then the PAC-2 version used in the 1991 Gulf War, and by launching the PAC-3 programme to provide a round with better anti-missile capability. PAC-1 and PAC-2 were developed to give the system a capability against the basic 300 km range ‘Scud’.

But given its ancestry, in range and ceiling terms PAC-3 remains in the same class as earlier Patriot rounds. It has a range of about 20 km and can typically engage targets at around 12,000 m altitude

When the USN needed a tactical ABM capability, it too was constrained by what it already had – in this case the Standard Missile, Aegis fire-control system, and the existing shipboard vertical-launch system. So the end result was the SM-3, with a range of about 1,200 km and a ceiling of 50-500 km. The introduction of the SM-3 Block 2 missile with an increased-diameter second stage will double the size of the area being defended, but I’ve seen no figures for the ceiling.

Adopting the Aegis/SM-3 system for land-based use would essentially have created a system based of fixed-site equivalents of a warship – rather like the “Desert Ship” land-based installation used for development firings.

THAAD was begun to create a transportable land-based tactical ABM system. Although this uses a single-stage design rather than SM-3’s three-stage configuration, it too relies on a small kill vehicle. The THAAD forecone separates from the missile body before impact and uses a liquid-propellant Divert-and-Attitude-Control System (DACS) for terminal manoeuvring.

Designed to be able to engage targets within the atmosphere (edo-atmospheric) and outside the atmosphere (exo-atmospheric), THAAD will provide an upper-tier capability when deployed alongside PAC-3 or the follow-on MEADS system. The combination of PAC-3 and THAAD can deal with about 75 per cent of the perceived ballistic threats.

Currently, THAAD has a range of about 300 km and a ceiling of up to 150,000 m, but this will able only to the initial version. If the USN proceeds with development of the planned Block 10 version of the missile, the existing booster stage will be replaced by a new booster almost twice the diameter, and a new ‘kick stage’ will be fitted between the booster and the forward section of the missile. For 3,000-5,000 km intermediate-range ballistic missiles, THAAD would have its maximum engagement range roughly tripled, and would have a limited terminal-defence capability against ICBM warheads.

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19 years 9 months

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The navy system was originally to be two tier but the lower tier got cancelled and replaced with the cheaper SM-6.

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17 years

Posts: 1,348

The navy system was originally to be two tier but the lower tier got cancelled and replaced with the cheaper SM-6.

Cancelled in 2001, the Block IVa would have provided a lower-tier capability. The SM-6 is focussed on air-breathing threats, but could eventually be given some degree of lower-tier capability.

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20 years 10 months

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So the end result was the SM-3, with a range of about 1,200 km and a ceiling of 50-500 km. The introduction of the SM-3 Block 2 missile with an increased-diameter second stage will double the size of the area being defended, but I’ve seen no figures for the ceiling.

SM -3 range and ceiling is amazing , never heard of SAM with such capability :cool:

So can SM-3 defence against ICBM type targets as well as one thats MIRVd ?

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17 years

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SM -3 range and ceiling is amazing , never heard of SAM with such capability

Think of it as a satellite launch vehicle that shrunk in the wash, rather than as a traditional heavy SAM. It's a three-stage vehicle that releases its final payload at about half the velocity needed to attain low-earth orbit.

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17 years 1 month

Posts: 133

Hahahahaha... yeah, it was the AEGIS system that tracked the satellite around the planet...

It's part of the system that was used for the intercept, which was a test of current US anti-satellite capability. And by the way, Aegis is not an acronym.

Wow claims for AEGIS just get better and better don't they... I expect in 5 years they are going to be detecting comets entering the solar system and determining which are on a collision course with Earth... :rolleyes:

There are more strawmen in this forum than an Iowa cornfield. :rolleyes:

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24 years 8 months

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if you really want to go the conspiracy route...how sure are you that the "satellite" that just got shot down wasn't part of an elaborate scheme to offer a target at just about...now.

Member for

16 years 8 months

Posts: 336

It’s been a while since I was last briefed some on some of the programmes you mentioned, SM-3, but I’m sufficiently familiar with all of them to take a stab at answering your question.

Currently, THAAD has a range of about 300 km and a ceiling of up to 150,000 m, but this will able only to the initial version. If the USN proceeds with development of the planned Block 10 version of the missile, the existing booster stage will be replaced by a new booster almost twice the diameter, and a new ‘kick stage’ will be fitted between the booster and the forward section of the missile.

Correction THAAD has a "200 km" Range and 150 km

Any ways here's some of what Russia has had over the past 40+ years:

1. http://www.opinionjournal.com/wsj/?id=85000693

2. http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/bg733.cfm

3. Critics of the ABM treaty argue that the
treaty is no longer binding because the Soviet
Union no longer exists and because the
Soviets were, and the Russians continue to be,
in violation of the treaty. They contend that
the Russians have more than the one ABM
system permitted by the treaty.

Joseph Arminio, chairman of the National Coalition
for Defense, states:
Not only did the U.S.S.R., unlike the
U.S., deploy the one missile defense
permitted by the treaty, ringing
Moscow with the 100 interceptors
sanctioned by law. It also littered
about Soviet territory with another
10,000 to 12,000 interceptors, and 18
battle-management radars. Together
the Moscow defense and the vast
homeland defense formed an interlocking
system—nearly all of it illicit.10

The “10,000 to 12,000 interceptors” to which
Arminio refers are SA-5, SA-10, and SA-12
anti-aircraft missiles that some ABM treaty
opponents argue have an anti-ballistic missile
capability.1 :

http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa337.pdf

There are more strawmen in this forum than an Iowa cornfield.

Geez Dork, I used a rolleyes smiley to clearly ID that comment as sarcasm and you think it is serious... :)

It's part of the system that was used for the intercept, which was a test of current US anti-satellite capability. And by the way, Aegis is not an acronym.

Without the space tracking assets designed for the NMD it wouldn't have been able to do the job. AEGIS might have seen the satellite go by but wouldn't have been able to reliably hit the target due to the closing velocities... for the same reason the Patriot needed satellite support to have a chance of hitting Scud variants in the Gulf war.

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17 years 1 month

Posts: 133

Geez Dork, I used a rolleyes smiley to clearly ID that comment as sarcasm and you think it is serious... :)

No problem, I've used a couple of sarcastic strawmen myself recently--just making a general observation. ;)

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17 years

Posts: 1,348

Correction THAAD has a "200 km" Range

The basic Lockheed Martin handout on the system does not quote a range, nor does the MDA equivalent, so I suspect that any figures in the public domain are estimates.

When Lockheed Martin last briefed me on THAAD, they showed me a coverage diagram, but didn't give me a copy. I made some notes, but don't have time to look for them.

Jane's Land Based Air Defence cites 200+ km, while Jane's Strategic Weapons gives 300 km. A US DoD presentation in my files implies a range of about 300 km.

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16 years 10 months

Posts: 1,019

It’s been a while since I was last briefed some on some of the programmes you mentioned, SM-3, but I’m sufficiently familiar with all of them to take a stab at answering your question.

There are in fact three programmes – THAAD, Patriot PAC-3, and Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) – that we need to consider. The way that these evolved was partly constrained by the existing hardware that both services already possessed.

Mr. Mercurius, thanks for your informative reply. I think to know the history of weapons development is important, so as to understand their use and how & what future weapons will be developed.

Actually, I referred to Patriot and Thaad as a single system because both are complementary to each other in targeting in the exo and endo atmospheres respectively, exactly like India's AAD-PAD combination. It is now clear that Patriot and Aegis have actually evolved independently from pre-existing rudimentary systems, whereas I thought they were begun separately to address the latest ballistic threats.